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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TIMOTHY RAY GREENE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NO. 44682
FREMONT COUNTY NO. CR 2016-274

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Timothy Greene contends the district court abused its discretion by not further reducing
his sentence when it granted his motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35).
Specifically, he asserts the district court’s decision was made in light of a clearly erroneous
conclusion that Mr. Greene did not suffer from a significant mental illness or other mental health
issues despite the fact that the presentence evaluations concluded he suffers from posttraumatic
stress disorder, depression, and alcohol dependence/alcohol neurocognitive disorder.
A sufficient consideration of that factor alongside the other mitigating factors reveals that
additional reduction of his sentence or retaining jurisdiction would better serve all the goals of
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sentencing. Therefore, this Court should either reduce Mr. Greene’s sentences as it deems
appropriate or remand this case for further reduction of his sentence.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Greene entered an Alford1 plea to an amended charge
of felony injury to a child based on allegations that he had sexual contact and/or erotically
touched the 17-year-old victim that night. (See Tr., pp.29-35.)2 He admitted those allegations
were possible due to his being drunk that night (New Year’s Eve). (See Tr., pp.26-27.) He
expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions. (See, e.g., Tr., p.28; PSI, p.23.)
During the presentence process, Mr. Greene participated in a GAIN-I evaluation and a
psychosexual evaluation (hereinafter, PSE).

The GAIN-I gave “rule-out” diagnoses for

posttraumatic stress disorder, acute stress disorder, or other extreme stress disorder; a mood
disorder not otherwise specified; and alcohol dependence.3 (Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI), p.75.) An ensuing mental health examination report stated that Mr. Greene
“presents with SMI [serious mental illness] or other MH [mental health] needs.” (PSI, p.90.)
The PSE validated those conclusions, explaining Mr. Greene’s current full DSM-5 diagnosis
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
The volume containing the transcripts in this case does not provide line numbers. Additionally,
pages 64 and 65 are missing from the volume provided to appellate counsel, which means the
electronic page numbers do not match the transcript page numbers after that point. A motion to
augment the record with the missing transcript pages has been filed contemporaneously with this
brief, and citations to the transcript will be to the transcript page number, not the electronic page
number.
3
The ensuing mental health examination report explained that the term “rule out” is used when
the GAIN assessor is not licensed to actually make mental health diagnoses, but a diagnosis is
generated by the GAIN process. (PSI, p.89.) Thus, such a diagnosis is provisional. (PSI, p.89.)
2

2

included major depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and moderate alcohol neurocognitive
disorder.4 (PSI, p.131.)
Accordingly, both the mental health examination and the GAIN-I recommended
Mr. Greene participate in intensive outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.85-86, 90-91.) The mental
health examination report also noted, if such treatment was not provided, Mr. Greene would
likely continue to struggle with his symptoms. (PSI, pp.90-91.) The PSE concluded treatment
was possible in the community and indicated that Mr. Greene presented either a low or moderate
risk to reoffend.5 (PSI, p.95.) However, the PSE also noted that Mr. Greene’s responses in the
polygraph portion of that examination had showed deception to all the relevant question sets.
(PSI, pp.158-59.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court identified several factors it was considering in
aggravation and mitigation. In mitigation, it considered the fact that this was Mr. Greene’s first
felony, that he had no prior sex offenses, that he had a troubled childhood and was potentially an
victim of abuse himself, that he had maintained regular, gainful employment, that his struggles
with substance abuse had some bearing on his behavior, and that he had the support of his friends
and family. (Tr., pp.72-73.) In aggravation, it considered the nature of the offense, the severity
of Mr. Greene’s conduct, his non-credible nature of Mr. Greene’s account of the events, and the
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The PSE author added a caveat that she would need additional information to make a diagnosis
in regard to a substance abuse disorder under the DSM-5 standards. (PSI, p.129.)
5
The narrative PSE report states Mr. Greene appears to present a low risk to reoffend. (PSI,
p.95.) However, it is not clear from that narrative report whether that conclusion was based on
just the results from the STATIC-99 test (on which Mr. Greene scored “0”), or whether it
included the results from the STABLE 2007 test as well. (See Tr., pp.48-49; PSI, p.95.)
Ultimately, the district court concluded it was just based on the STATIC-99 results, and that, by
looking at a scale indicator in the PSE, Mr. Greene’s combined score indicated a moderate risk to
reoffend. (See Tr., pp.48-49; PSI, p.94 (noting Mr. Green’s total score was 4 and the interpretive
ranges were: “0-3 = Low, 4-11 = Moderate”) (emphasis omitted).)
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fact that he had not apologized directly to the victim. (Tr., pp.73-75.) It did not consider
Mr. Greene’s mental health issues one way or the other, as it stated:

“The mental health

assessment indicates that the Defendant suffers from no substantial mental illness earned [sic]
and is not in need of mental health treatment.” (Tr., p.63.)
Defense counsel ultimately recommended the district court retain jurisdiction so that
Mr. Greene could begin treatment and the district court could sentence him with more insight on
the issues surrounding the deceptive polygraph. (Tr., p.52.) The district court, however, decided
to impose and execute a unified sentence of ten years, with six years fixed. (Tr., p.77.) It also
imposed a twenty-five thousand dollar fine. (Tr., p.78.)
Mr. Greene filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.141,
148.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. (R., p. 151.) The district court
scheduled a hearing to address the Rule 35 motion and the State’s pending motion for
restitution.6 (See R., pp.160, 169-71.) At that hearing, defense counsel provided a new letter
from Mr. Greene’s fiancé in support of the motion, which the district court admitted over the
State’s objections. (Tr., pp.84-85; Exhibit, p.2.) Mr. Greene also made a statement in which he
acknowledged the need for, and expressed his dedication to, treatment and rehabilitation, and he
also apologized directly to the victim and her family. (Tr., pp.96-98.) As such, the defense
requested the district court reconsider its decision to not retain jurisdiction, or alternatively,
reduce the term of sentence to two years fixed, with a long period of indeterminate sentence.
(Tr., pp.85, 90, 97.) Defense counsel also requested the district court reconsider the amount of
the fine based on Mr. Greene’s inability to pay the higher amount. (Tr., p.89.)
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The order for $4,312.00 in restitution for testing of a rape kit in this case (see R., p.166) is not
being challenged in this appeal.
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The district court explained that it had not retained jurisdiction because, in considering
the nature of the crime, it had determined probation was not a viable option in this case, meaning
there was no point to retaining jurisdiction. (Tr., p.107.) As a result, it denied Mr. Greene’s
request for that particular relief. (See Tr., p.107.) However, it granted his motion in regard to
the fine, reducing it to ten thousand dollars.

(Tr., p.110.)

It also explained that it felt

reconsideration of the term of sentence was appropriate based on Mr. Greene’s comments at the
Rule 35 hearing, as well as a more sufficient consideration of the fact that Mr. Greene had been
intoxicated that night, which, while not an excuse for his actions, indicated Mr. Greene “was
likely not in total possession of his good judgment at the time.” (Tr., p.112.) The district court
did not discuss Mr. Greene’s mental health diagnoses in making that decision. (See generally
Tr.) Ultimately though, the district court adjusted the length of the fixed and indeterminate terms
of Mr. Greene’s sentence, changing it to a unified sentence of ten years, with only four years
fixed. (Tr., pp.111-12; R., pp.174-76.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by not further reducing Mr. Greene’s sentence
when it granted his Rule 35 motion.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Further Reducing Mr. Greene’s Sentence When
It Granted His Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007). When reviewing an exercise of discretion, the appellate courts evaluate (1) whether
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the district court recognized the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and (3) whether it
reached its decision in an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). “The
criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253
(Ct. App. 1994). Additionally, when petitioning for a sentence reduction pursuant to Rule 35,
the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
presented to the sentencing court. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. Therefore, the district court
needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating
factors as they were altered by the new evidence Mr. Greene presented. See id.; Trent, 125 Idaho
at 253.
A review of the record in this case reveals that the district court abused its discretion by
not further reducing Mr. Greene’s sentence because it did not reach that decision in accordance
with the legal standards applicable to that decision. Specifically, it did not consider the impact of
Mr. Greene’s mental health issues on its sentencing decisions as required by statute and Idaho
Supreme Court precedent. I.C. § 19-2523; Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Rather,
its sentencing decisions, including its ruling on Mr. Greene’s Rule 35 motion, were made in light
of its clearly-erroneous conclusion that Mr. Greene “suffers from no substantial mental illnesses
earned [sic] and is not in need of mental health treatment.” (Tr., p.63.)
That conclusion was clearly erroneous because the mental health examination report
states precisely the opposite: “Timothy Greene presents with SMI [serious mental illness] or
other MH [mental health] needs as noted above in 19-2524 report.” (PSI, p.90; see PSI p.25
(repeating that conclusion verbatim in the PSI report itself).) That conclusion was based on the
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GAIN-I evaluation’s “rule out” diagnosis of “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Acute Stress
Disorder, or other disorder of extreme stress”; of a “mood disorder [not otherwise specified]”;
and of alcohol dependence. (PSI, p.75.) Those diagnoses were verified by the PSE author, who
explained Mr. Greene’s current full DSM-5 diagnosis included major depression, posttraumatic
stress disorder, and alcohol neurocognitive disorder. (PSI, p.131.) Since the district court did
not appreciate the fact that Mr. Greene was actually suffering from mental health issues, it did
not consider the impact of those conditions in its sentencing decisions.
Furthermore, those mental health conditions may have an impact on one of the issues the
district court determined needed to be reconsidered in ruling on Mr. Greene’s motion for
leniency: Mr. Greene’s ability to exercise good judgment the night of the incident. (Tr., p.110
(specifically reassessing the impact Mr. Greene’s voluntary intoxication in that regard).) In fact,
the Legislature has specifically recognized this connection, instructing sentencing courts to
consider the impact of the defendant’s mental health issues on “the capacity of the defendant . . .
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged.”
I.C. § 19-2523(f). Therefore, a sufficient consideration of that mitigating factor, alongside the
other relevant mitigating factors in this case, indicates a further reduction of Mr. Greene’s
sentence was appropriate.
As such, the district court abused its discretion because, due to its clearly erroneous
conclusion about the existence of a relevant mitigating factor, it did not make its sentencing
decisions consistent with the applicable legal standards.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Greene respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for further
reduction of his sentence.
DATED this 31st day of May, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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